Veto Power or Stalled: Options Amid Fubara's Impeachment Update

The unfolding political drama in Rivers State reached a critical juncture on January 22, 2026, when the Chief Judge of the state, Justice Simeon Amadi, formally declined the House of Assembly's request to constitute a seven-member investigative panel to probe Governor Siminalayi Fubara and Deputy Governor Ngozi Odu.

In a letter addressed to Speaker Martin Amaewhule, the Chief Judge clarified that while the Assembly had forwarded a resolution on January 16 alleging "gross misconduct," his hands were legally tied by two interim injunctions issued by the Rivers State High Court.

These orders, granted by Justice Florence Fiberesima in suits OYHC/7/CS/2026 and OYHC/6/CS/2026, specifically restrain the Chief Judge from receiving, considering, or acting upon any impeachment-related documents for a period of seven days, with the next hearing scheduled for January 23, 2026. Justice Amadi invoked the legal doctrine of lis pendens, which mandates that parties refrain from actions that might prejudice the outcome of a pending court case, especially as the lawmakers have already filed an appeal against the injunctions.

The question of whether the legislative arm can use its "veto power" to override the Chief Judge's refusal is a complex constitutional issue.

Under Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the legislature holds the primary power of impeachment, and Section 188(10) contains an "ouster clause" stating that no proceedings or determinations of the House or the investigative panel shall be questioned in any court. However, Nigerian judicial precedent, notably in the cases of Inakoju v. Adeleke and Ladoja v. INEC, has established that the courts can intervene if the constitutional procedure is not strictly followed. There is no provision for a "legislative veto" that can force a Chief Judge to act in defiance of a direct court order; rather, the legislature’s recourse is through the appellate process to vacate the injunction.

From a constitutional and ethical standpoint, the current development favors Governor Fubara in the short term by providing a procedural "breathing space." Section 188(5) mandates that the Chief Judge must appoint the panel within seven days of a resolution, but this duty is predicated on the legality of the process leading up to it.

The lawmakers, meanwhile, rely on the strict interpretation of Section 188(10) to argue that the judiciary has no business interfering in what they deem an internal legislative matter. Ethically, this tug-of-war highlights the fragility of the "separation of powers" in Nigeria, where the judiciary is often dragged into political skirmishes to act as a buffer. The refusal of the Chief Judge to constitute the panel—citing a higher duty to uphold a subsisting court order—underscores a commitment to the rule of law over political expediency, suggesting that until the legal validity of the Assembly's resolution is settled, the impeachment process remains effectively stalled.